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The Efficient Performance Hypothesis
A B ST R ACT. Notable American jurists and scholars have advanced an approach to contract
enforcement that would render breach legally and morally uncontestable, assuming
compensation follows. Much of the justification for this endeavor has rested upon claims of
judicial and economic efficiency. But efficiency neither favors nor disfavors this conception of
contract, formalized by the efficient breach hypothesis. This Essay develops an alternative
approach to contract enforcement, expressed as the efficient performance hypothesis. The
alternative approach predicts the same efficiency as the traditional one, but differs starkly in
terms of its ethical understanding of contractual obligation. The efficient breach hypothesis
supposes that the promisor has the legal right- not merely the power - to choose to perform or
pay damages. That right belongs to the promisee under the efficient performance hypothesis.
These discrete conceptions of promissory obligation do not exhaust the possibilities of course,
but taken together the hypotheses suggest that other conceptions of legal and moral obligation
may be employed within an efficient enforcement framework.
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INTRODUCTION
Law and economics scholarship has advanced a number of provocative
arguments in the name of efficiency-from promoting insider trading to
establishing markets for babies-but none is perhaps quite so controversial as
the argument behind the efficient breach hypothesis.1 The idea that legally
obligated parties ought to be encouraged to breach their contracts when it is in
their self-interest to do so would seem to threaten a greater "social interest in
the stability of promises as a social and economic institution."2 But as efficient
breach advocates point out, promoting economic and social welfare is the very
basis of the hypothesis. Furthermore, efficient breach does not, as often
suggested, disallow enforcement of inefficient contracts. Rather, it supposes a
system of strict enforcement of all contracts, regardless of their efficiency.'
Enforcing a contract does not necessarily require the performance of the
specified action; it may instead entail the imposition of penalties,4 though as
Richard Craswell observed, "this form of enforcement is rarely considered in
the philosophical literature on promising, which usually assumes that promises
must either (1) oblige the promisor to perform the promised actions, or (2)
have no moral force at all." Efficient breach of contract occupies "an
intermediate level of moral force."6
1. "Repudiation of obligations should be encouraged where the promisor is able to profit from
his default after placing his promisee in as good a position as he would have occupied had
performance been rendered." Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures,
and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970).
2. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 237 (1922). David Hume
similarly urged "that promises are human inventions, founded on the necessities and
interests of society," without which "the commerce of [good] offices in a manner lost among
mankind" would grind to a halt, leaving "every one reduc'd to his own skill and industry for
his well-being and subsistence." DAVID HuME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. 1II, pt. II,
§ 5, at 519-20 (P.H. Nidditch ed., 2d ed. 1978) (1739-1740).
3. See Richard Craswell, Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises, in THE THEORY OF
CONTRACT LAW: NEWESSAYS 19, 26-27 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
4. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
17 (1981) ("If I make a promise to you, I should do as I promise; and if I fail to keep my
promise, it is fair that I should be made to hand over the equivalent of the promised
performance. In contract doctrine this proposition appears as the expectation measure of
damages for breach.").
5. Craswell, supra note 3, at 27.
6. Id. One can choose not to perform, but one will then be liable. Scholars have attacked this
theory as undermining the way in which we ought to understand a promise. See, e.g., Daniel
Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989); Peter Linzer, On the
Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L.
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Moral force at this intermediate level, and no higher, was exactly what
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes identified in his celebrated essay The Path of the
Law.7 "The duty to keep a contract at common law," Holmes proposed, "means
a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it, -and nothing
else." From there followed his option theory of contract, which according to
Richard Posner clarified the traditional view whereby "'duty' is vague, abstract.
Holmes pointed out that in a regime in which the sanction for breach of
contract is merely an award of compensatory damages to the victim, the entire
practical effect of signing a contract is that by doing so one obtains an option to
break it." 9 Holmes supported his proposition with an extensive discussion of
the old English case Bromage v. Genning. ° While the court did voice concern
about subverting the promisor's intent that it be his choice to pay damages or
perform," it also expressed concern that if the promisor were ordered to
perform and he refused, there was no remedy other than to imprison his
body. 2 We are reminded that promisors have always had options. "Perform or
REV. 111, 138-39 (1981). Yet most critics stop short of describing the efficient breach
hypothesis as immoral or even amoral, as suggested above. Thomas Scanlon, for instance,
advocates an obligation to perform, instead of an obligation to perform or pay damages, but
does not claim that the alternative is morally unacceptable. Thomas M. Scanlon, Promises
and Practices, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 199, 205 (1990).
7. OW. Holmes, The Path of the Law, lo HARV. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897) ("Nowhere is the
confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest than in the law of contract.").
8. Id.
9. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAw, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 58 (2003).
10. (1616) 81 Eng. Rep. 540 (K.B.). In this case, "a prohibition was sought in the King's Bench
against a suit in the marches of Wales for the specific performance of a covenant to grant a
lease." Holmes, supra note 7, at 462.
11. "Coke said that [specific performance] would subvert the intent of the covenantor, since he
intends it to be at his election either to lose the damages or to make the lease." Holmes,
supra note 7, at 462.
12. Bromage, 81 Eng. Rep. 540. This was "[t]he oldest method of enforcement in Roman law,"
involving "seizure of the person, to coerce satisfaction or hold the promisor in bondage until
his kinsmen performed the judgment." POUND, supra note 2, at 239. This practice found its
way into the common law and remained there through the nineteenth century. Alfred Avins,
Involuntary Servitude in British Commonwealth Law, 16 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 29 (1967);
Richard Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REv. 24 (1926). Holmes himself was
neither unfamiliar nor uneasy with the notion of criminal penalties for breach of contract. In
response to Alabama's peonage laws around the turn of the twentieth century, he observed
that the Constitution, and apparently the common law, does not "prevent[] a State from
making a breach of contract . . . a crime and punishing it as such." United States v.
Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914) (Holmes, J., concurring); see also Bailey v. Alabama, 219
U.S. 219, 246 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Suggestions that Holmes had in mind the
efficient breach hypothesis (which is predicated on expectation damages) are undermined
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pay" and "perform or prison," however, merely describe economic choices;
they say nothing about the legal character of these options. The power to
perform or pay is not the same as the right to perform or pay. All duties, at
some level, are optional, making "perform or pay" a rather weak conception of
duty. I am of course not the first to observe this gossamer notion of duty
(Holmes himself expressed this criticism).13 But I shall advance here that it has
little to do with economic efficiency.
Avoiding specific performance of inefficient contracts creates value. Think
of it as a contractual opportunity, which - like partnership opportunities - can
be viewed as belonging to the joint venturers (the promisor and promisee in
this case). Without saying more, it remains morally ambiguous to whom the
gains of this opportunity should go, or whether they should be shared and, if
so, how. Efficiency considerations offer equally ambiguous guidance. Even a
concern for allocative efficiency alone does not provide an a priori justification
for giving promisors the gains of nonperformance. The fact that
nonperformance of an existing contractual obligation is sometimes efficient -
which is to say, it sometimes produces more gains than performance-is
analytically distinct from a rule giving the promisor an option to acquire those
gains.
Here is where the controversy over the efficient breach hypothesis lies. It is
not in the suggestion that some promises need not be kept. By almost every
normative criterion, not all promises should be kept. Doctrine excusing
performance for frustration of purpose, for instance, does not provoke moral
outrage. What provokes disapproval of the efficient breach hypothesis are
strong moral sentiments that nonperformance of a contractual promise is not a
right, but in fact is a wrong, and that promisors should not profit from the
by - though not entirely inconsistent with - his embrace of punitive remedies for breach of
contract.
13. The consequentialist understanding of duty expressed in The Path of the Law is properly
attributed to the Holmesian bad man and not directly to Holmes, as he was "speaking from
the bad man's point of view." Holmes, supra note 7, at 461. Indeed, many years earlier,
Holmes explicitly rejected this understanding of legal duty: "A legal duty cannot be said to
exist if the law intends to allow the person supposed to be subject to it an option at a certain
price." [Oliver W. Holmes, Jr.], The Law Magazine and Review, 6 AM. L. REV. 723, 724 (1872)
(reviewing [Frederick Pollock], Law and Command, 1 LAw MAG. & REv. 189 (1872)),
reprinted in i THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLtMES 294, 296 (Sheldon M. Novick ed.,
1995). Holmes viewed nonperformance of contract as a legal wrong that compelled
compensation. Paying compensation was not in his view an alternative form of performance
or a legal right to which promisors were entitled. See Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver
Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1o85, 1o86-
89 (2000).
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unilateral exercise of their power to perform or not. Yet that distribution of
profit and power is not required for allocative efficiency.
This Essay develops an efficient performance hypothesis, structured to give
the promisee the right to compel performance and capture all or some of the
profits when nonperformance is elected. The key to this approach is situating
the promisee to weigh the marginal costs and benefits of performance. That is
exactly what the efficient breach hypothesis accomplishes with regard to the
promisor. For the promisee, the efficient performance hypothesis can work just
as well by giving her the choice between performance and disgorgement of the
promisor's cost as the remedy for breach. 4 Indeed, this hypothesis predicts the
same allocatively efficient outcome as the efficient breach hypothesis but offers
a distribution of rights and gains that is more consistent with the moral
sentiments described above.
Allocative efficiency does not call for any particular allotment of rights and
surplus. The First Theorem of Welfare Economics established this claim long
ago."5 With specific reference to contract, scholars have shown generally (and
quite dramatically) that efficiency is achievable over a continuum of allocative
rights and distributions of surplus-the possibilities are literally infinite. 6 The
purpose of this Essay, however, is not to reiterate the basic principles of welfare
economics or the compelling work on the optimal design of liability rules.
Rather, it is to show that efficiency is consistent with more robust notions of
contractual duty than those employed by the Holmesian bad man. 7 Stronger
forms of enforcement, such as giving the promisee the right to elect specific
14. In other words, the promisee is made to consider the value (through performance) and the
cost (through disgorgement) of contract performance. Trading off value and cost in this
way, the promisee will elect contract performance only if it is efficient. This is just what the
promisor does under the efficient breach hypothesis, which situates the promisor to
consider the value (through expectation damages) and the cost (through performance) of
contract performance.
15. Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railvay and
Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938).
16. See LAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005). Inl torts,
Guido Calabresi and Jon Hirschoff illustrated this point with their reverse Learned Hand
rule. Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a TestJbr Strict Liability in Tors, 81 YALE
L.J. 1o55, 1059 (1972).
17. The Holmesian bad man refers to a legal actor who is not driven by his conscience or
morality, but who rather "finds his reasons for his conduct" in predictions of the material
consequences that are likely to follow. Holmes, supra note 7, at 459. Thus, Holmes's bad
man is akin to Hume's knave: "[I]n contriving any system of government . . . every man
ought to be supposed to be a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private
interest." DAVID HUME, Of the Independency of Parliament (1741), in ESSAYS: MORAL,
POLITICAL AND LITERARY 40, 40 (Oxford Univ. Press 1963).
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performance or supracompensatory damages, can allow for optimal allocation
of resources while achieving a higher degree of moral force than the
intermediate level associated with efficient breach.
Part I lays out the basic taxonomy (and derived rules) of entitlement
assignment and protection set forth by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed
as well as the contract damage scheme suggested by Lon Fuller and William
Perdue. Together these approaches introduce the fundamental ways in which
courts may combine various rules with damage awards in crafting a remedy.
Part II then develops the structural framework of the Essay. This framework
associates contractual enforcement with the triple {e, d, m}, in which e
represents the entitlement holder, d denotes who has the legal right to allocate
the entitlement, and m is the measure of damages paid to the entitlement
holder when the entitlement is allocated away from her.
Isolating e, d, and m, and then considering their interaction, allows for a
somewhat more explicit understanding of contract enforcement, efficiency, and
distribution. For instance, when the promisee is the entitlement holder (e), the
efficient breach hypothesis implicitly assigns the allocative decision (d) to the
promisor and sets damages (m) to the expectation measure. Given this setup,
the marginal gains and losses associated with allocation accrue entirely to the
promisor, who therefore has an incentive to allocate (i.e., to perform or not)
efficiently. This structure also makes plain the efficient performance
hypothesis, which assigns the entitlement (e) and the allocative decision (d) to
the promisee and allows a variety of damage measures (m), from expectation to
disgorgement. Observe that e, d, and m operate simply as identifiers. Part II's
analysis does not focus on how, as a general matter, e, d, and m should be
assigned."8 Part III does, however, address the normative implications of
entitlement assignment (e) and allocation rights (d). The categorical damage
measures (m), it turns out, are not particularly relevant for the argument
advanced here.
18. For a comprehensive discussion of how d and m should be assigned given the objective of
efficiency, see AYREs, supra note 16. Ian Ayres does touch on the assignment of e,
particularly in the torts context, but the efficiency justifications for promissory entitlement
assignment are more difficult to maintain. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
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I. MEANS AND AIMS OF CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
This Part merges the contract remedy taxonomy originated by Fuller and
Perdue (expanded by Avery Katz) 9 with the taxonomy of property rules and
liability rules developed by Calabresi and Melamed (expanded by Ian Ayres)."
The former focuses on a court's aims in terms of situating one or both parties
following a breach, while the latter addresses the means available to a court to
implement these aims. These means and aims combine to create a dense
remedial regime.
A. Assigning and Protecting Contractual Entitlements
Let's begin with Calabresi and Melamed's dichotomy of how law assigns
and protects legal entitlements. In a dispute between A and B, a court may
assign the entitlement to either A or B. The court's choice of entitlement
assignment (e) is not usually the subject of welfare analyses." The assignment
of e, represented by the rows in Figure 1, is typically seen as predetermined by
existing legal relations, which the court is simply asked to identify without
regard to efficiency or other welfare considerations. The columns in Figure 1
show the court's choices for how to protect the entitlement: a property rule and
a liability rule. Property rules protect entitlements by using the state's police
powers to prohibit nonconsensual appropriations, whereas liability rules use
court-determined monetary compensation to discourage nonconsensual
appropriations. The matrix of entitlement assignment and protection reveals
four general rules that are available to judges for resolving disputes.
ig. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J.
52, 61 (1936); Avery Katz, Reflections on Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: A Positive Economic Framework, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 541 (1988).
2o. AYPEs, supra note 16; Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1o89 (1972).
21. That is, unless the court proposes to enforce only ex post efficient contracts and the like, a
proposition that few would seriously defend. But efficiency may be a useful criterion when
addressing the costs associated with entitlement assignment. The court may favor rules that
minimize the costs of creating and identifying legally enforceable promises. For example,
when there is uncertainty over the assignment, the court may well use efficiency to
temporarily assign an entitlement pending its determination. See, e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks
& Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the Preliminary Injunction
Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381 (2005). Similarly, courts sometimes void otherwise
enforceable contracts based on policy considerations or justice concerns, such as those
embodied in the unconscionability doctrine.
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Figure i.
FORM OF ENTITLEMENT PROTECTION
PROPERTY RULE LIABILITY RULE
A (PROMISEE) Rule 1 Rule 2
ENTITLEMENT
HOLDER
B (PROMISOR) Rule 3 Rule 4
The four rules are typically illustrated with a pollution nuisance dispute,
but a breach of contract dispute works just as well.22 Assume that B (the
promisor) has declined to honor a promise made to A (the promisee). The
court may determine that the promisor is obligated to keep the promise (i.e., it
may assign the promissory entitlement to the promisee) and protect the
promisee's entitlement either by invoking the state's police powers (Rule 1) or
by ordering the promisor to pay money damages to the promisee (Rule 2).
Alternatively, the court may assign the entitlement to the promisor (i.e., it may
allow the promisor to avoid the promissory obligation) and protect that
assignment either by invoking the state's police powers (Rule 3) or by ordering
the promisee to pay monetary compensation if she appropriates the promisor's
entitlement (Rule 4).
The square matrix suggested by Calabresi and Melamed remained
undisturbed for two decades, until scholars recognized that the liability rule
structure was essentially a call option. 3 That is, one party has the legal right to
purchase the other's entitlement without her consent. As one of the principal
contributors to this reconceptualization of Rules 2 and 4 has observed, "Once
the traditional liability rules were reconceived as granting a potential taker a
call option, it became almost inevitable that scholars would wonder whether
put-option rules might not also be desirable."' 4 The mirror image of call
22. Indeed, explicit contractual illustrations may be distinctly useful. See Carol M. Rose, The
Shadow of the Cathedral, 1o6 YALE L.J. 2175 (1997) (arguing that while nuisance is frequently
offered as the motivating example in discussing the four rules, the true motivation often lies
in other areas of the law, such as contracts and the law of accidents, and that the cost of
these shadow examples has been an unfortunate blurring of legal principles).
23. See, e.g., AYRES, supra note 16; Ronen Avraham, Modular Liability Rules, 24 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 269 (2004); Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the
Design of Liability Rules, tOO MICH. L. REv. 1 (2001); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab,
Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 440
(1995); Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 822 (1993).
24. AYRES, supra note 16, at 15.
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options, put options give parties the right to sell their entitlements to others
without their consent.
The options framework expands Calabresi and Melamed's matrix,
modeling Rules 2 and 4 as call options and introducing two new rules, Rules 5
and 6, as put options. Thus under Rule 2, the promisor (B) has a call option to
take the promisee's (A's) entitlement at an option price determined by the
court. Rule 5 gives the promisor a put option, allowing her to make the
promisee pay her a court-determined amount for some performed promise.
Rules 4 and 6 may be similarly defined with respect to the promisee. Rule 4 is
simply a call option for the promisee, which allows her to buy the promisor's
entitlement (i.e., to avoid promissory obligation) at an option price determined
by the court. Finally, Rule 6 gives the promisee a put option, allowing her to
force the promisor to buy her entitlement to promissory performance for a
court-determined amount. Figure 2 updates Calabresi and Melamed's matrix
by incorporating the new rules.
Figure 2.
FORM OF ENTITLEMENT PROTECTION
PROPERTY RULE LIABILITY CALL LIABILITY PUT
A (PROMISEE) Rule i Rule 2 Rule 6
ENTITLEMENT
HOLDER
B (PROMISOR) Rule 3 Rule 4 Rule 5
B. Counterfactual Aims of Contract Remedies
The framework above suggests possible approaches (rules) that courts may
use to assign and protect entitlements. But it doesn't tell us what the court is
attempting to do when remedying breaches, or how the court should choose
among these rules given its objectives. Rules 1 through 6 may be combined
with different damage awards to generate a dizzying array of choices. For
example, a Rule 2 call option for the promisor could be combined with
different money damage awards (which effectively set the option price), just as
a Rule 6 put option for the promisee may be joined with various damage
measures. I will have more to say about these configurations later, but for the
moment, rather than focusing on specific option-damage combinations, it is
worthwhile to consider the court's objectives in crafting these remedies.
In general, the court seeks to undo the effect of either the breach or the
promise on one or both parties. In other words, the court is attempting to
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realize the equivalent of some counterfactual state. For example, the court may
use property rules such as specific performance, which places both parties in
the positions they would have been in had there not been a breach, or
rescission and cancellation (assuming no reliance expenditures), which place
the parties in the positions they would have enjoyed had there not been a
contract. Liability rules may be similarly combined with various damage
awards to achieve these counterfactual states. Figure 3 highlights the four
primary objectives that the court may pursue when remedying a breach of
contract. As the top row shows, expectation damages place the promisee in the
position she would have been in had the contract been performed, while
reliance undoes the effect of the promise from the promisee's perspective. The
bottom row focuses on the promisor, with disgorgement achieving the
counterfactual no-breach state and restitution (narrowly construed) achieving
the counterfactual no-promise state. Any of these four remedies (and others)
may be combined with any of the four liability rules (Rules 2, 4, 5, and 6).
Figure 3.
COUNTERFACTUAL STATE





In undoing the breach or the promise, the court may be motivated by a
number of normative justifications including autonomy, corrective and
distributive justice, cooperation, fairness, and efficiency. With regard to
efficiency, there are three stages at which parties make choices that have
efficiency implications: the ex ante stage, when parties decide whether to enter
into contracts; the interim stage, when contracts have been formed but are not
yet complete, parties decide whether to rely (or invest) based on their
agreements and the enforcement regime; and the ex post stage, when parties
decide whether to perform or breach contracts. While no single rule/damage-
award combination leads to efficiency in all three stages (or even just two) with
respect to both promisee and promisor, the Rule-2/expectation-damages
combination-the focus of the efficient breach hypothesis-has held a special
place in the literature on contract remedies, and it is not hard to see why. Rule
2, which assigns the call option to the promisor, is motivated by the efficiency
it produces (given the damage award), and the expectation damage award,
which ensures that the promisee is no worse off from the breach, is motivated
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by the weakly Pareto-superior outcome that is realized (given the call option).
But the unique prominence afforded this rule-damage combination is
unwarranted. As the next two Parts show, there are other combinations that
are equally efficient and potentially more consistent with the other normative
understandings of contract enforcement.
II. PROMISOR'S AND PROMISEE'S ELECTION
The following hypothetical is used to motivate the analysis. Take two
parties -a buyer (B) and seller (S) -who have entered a contract in which B
agrees to pay S a price of P = $12,000 in exchange for S's car, which B values at
VB = $15,000. (Assume that S places no direct value on the car; i.e., vs = $o.) Ex
ante, therefore, this is an efficient agreement. Transferring $12,000 from B's
pockets to S's creates no efficiency implications -it is purely distributional -
but when the car moves from S to B, $15,ooo of wealth is created. Let's say that
B pays S upfront and then, in expectation of getting the car a month later, B
rents a parking space for $200 (nonrefundable)." Now imagine that before S
delivers the car, a competing buyer (C) offers a higher price for the car. The
competing buyer offers S either $13,000 or $20,000. For simplicity, assume
that these prices reflect the competing buyer's full value of the car, that is,
either vc = $13,000 or Vc = $20,000.
A. Promisor's Election and Efficient Breach
The efficient breach hypothesis is premised on the Holmesian option
theory of contract obligation: "The duty to keep a contract at common law
means ...you must pay damages if you do not keep it."'2 6 Translating this
observation into the taxonomy of entitlement protection described above, one
could say that Holmes viewed promisees' entitlements as protected by Rule 2.
The Rule 2 option combined with expectation damages led law and economics
scholars in the early 1970s to recognize the efficient breach hypothesis 7 -
25. Assume that without the parking space rental, the car is worth significantly less to B (say,
$12,500).
26. Holmes, supra note 7, at 462.
27. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 56-59 (1972); John H. Barton,
The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, i J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972);
Birmingham, supra note 1; Robert L. Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic
Rationality: The Geomety of Contract Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 49; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an
Enfbrcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554 (1977).
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namely, that promisors under this regime will exercise their call options (i.e.,
their options to breach and pay damages) only when breaching is efficient.
The efficient breach hypothesis is straightforwardly illustrated with the
buyer-seller hypothetical from above. Because the buyer pays upfront, the
analysis can focus on the seller's decision to perform or breach. If C values the
car at Vc = $20,000, then allocative efficiency disfavors the car's going to B
(because Vc > vB), and S should breach; but if C values the car at vc = $13,000,
then social optimality- measured in terms of allocative efficiency- requires S
to perform the contract (because vB > vc). The seller, however, does not make
the breach decision based on what is socially optimal. She will breach if and
only if her expected cost of performance (i.e., the opportunity cost based on the
forgone chance to sell to C) is greater than her expected cost of breach, which is
determined by the court remedy for breach.
Recall the remedies suggested earlier and assume that the entitlement is
assigned to B. The court has at its disposal four principal money damage
remedies: (1) restitution, whereby the court orders S to return B's upfront
payment ($12,000); (2) reliance, whereby the court orders S to return B's
upfront payment plus her reasonable expenditures in reliance on the contract
($12,200); (3) expectation, whereby the court orders S to pay B's value of
performance ($15,ooo); and (4) disgorgement, whereby the court orders S to
disgorge the gains received from the breach of the contract ($13,000 or
$20,000). Table i summarizes the payoff to the parties under these four
damage remedies when the contract is not performed.
Table i.
BUYER'S AND SELLER'S NONPERFORMANCE PAYOFFS (IN DOLLARS) UNDER VARIOUS
DAMAGE REMEDIES
Restitution 12,000 20,000 32,000 12,000 13,000 25,000
Reliance 12,200 19,8OO 32,000 12,200 12,8OO 25,000
Expectation 15,ooo 17,000 32,000 15,000 10,000 25,000
Disgorgement 20,000 12,000 32,000 13,000 12,000 25,000
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As a point of departure, note that when the contract is performed, the joint
payoff for B and S is $27,000.28 Allocative efficiency therefore requires
nonperformance of the contract when Vc = $20,000 (because, as shown in
Table i, the nonperformance joint payoff is $32,000) and performance when vc
= $13,000 (because then the nonperformance joint payoff is only $25,o00).29
But again, the seller does not compare the joint (i.e., social) payoffs from
performance and breach. When deciding whether to perform or breach, S
compares her individual payoff from performance (receiving $12,000 from B)
to her individual payoff from breach given the court-determined remedies
(shown in the columns labeled ts). Whenever rus > $12,000, S will breach.
Table 1 shows that only the expectation remedy leads S to perform and breach
efficiently in all cases. The expectation remedy forces S to internalize the value
of performance (by setting damages equal to B's value) when considering the
cost of performance (her opportunity costs of not selling to C).
B. Promisee's Election and Efficient Performance
Marginal value and cost comparisons are the keys to determining efficient
behavior. It matters little who is making the comparisons, as long as they are
being made accurately. Courts can make the comparison. Promisors can as
well, as indicated by the efficient breach hypothesis. Even promisees can be put
in a position to make the appropriate comparisons. When a promisee is given
the option to decide whether the contract should be performed, she too can be
forced to internalize the other party's costs. To see how this can be achieved,
consider again the entitlement options framework set forth in Figure 4. If the
promisee is assigned the entitlement, then it quickly becomes apparent that
specific performance (Rule 1) and Holmes's call option (Rule 2) are not the
only ways that the promisee's entitlement may be protected. This framework
reminds us to keep our eyes open for "puts" whenever we observe "calls." But
how might Rule 6 be operationalized in this context? Imagine that the
promisee, instead of seeking specific performance, could force the promisor not
to perform and could then make her pay damages for breach.
a8. This is the gross joint payoff for the parties (i.e., not including reliance payments). The net
joint payoff is $14,8oo: S gets $12,ooo and B nets $28oo ($15,ooo - $12,200).
29. The payoff to S from nonperformance is derived by adding the payments S receives from B
and C ($12,000 + $20,000 or $12,000 + $13,ooo), and subtracting the amount that S would
have to pay B in damages for breaching. B's payoffs are calculated by considering what she
would get through the court remedy as described above. The net joint payoff is $19,8oo
when Vc = $20,ooo and $19,8oo when vc = $20,000.
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Figure 4.
REMEDIAL OPTION FOR PROMISEE
PROPERTY RULE LIABILITY CALL LIABILITY PUT
Rule I Rule 2 Rule 6
It may seem a little odd to think of promisees forcing promisors to breach
their promises and then making them pay for the breach (and, indeed, there is
extensive case law discouraging the practice of induced breach). However, the
idea that promisees should be given the choice among remedies, including
performance of the contract (specific performance) or payment (money
damages), when the promisor breaches is not so strange." Nor is it novel.
With regard to contracts involving real property, courts often offer promisees
the option of receiving damages or performance. The same option was long
ago suggested for chattel transactions. "Judge Story urge[d] that there is no
reasonable objection to allowing the party who is injured by the breach of any
contract for the sale of chattels to have an election either to take damages at law
or to have specific performance in equity."31 More recently, Alan Schwartz has
argued (based on efficiency considerations) that promisees should have the
option of electing specific performance or expectation damages when
promisors breach.
32
Yet notice that Schwartz's put option for promisees -that is, giving the
promisee the option of compelling performance or getting expectation
30. This approach should be viewed, not as a pure put option for the promisee, but as what
Ayres calls a Dual Chooser Rule, whereby the promisor's initial action (choice) can trigger
the promisee's put option. For example, the promisor might first cause the promisee to
demand assurances or breach anticipatorily, which allows the put option to come about.
These are also called higher-order liability rules. See AYREs, supra note 16, at 34, 96-98.
31. Curtice Bros. v. Catts, 66 A. 935, 935-36 (N.J. Ch. 1907) (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA
§ 717a, at 36 (Melville H. Bigelow ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 13th ed. 1886)). Perhaps
service contracts are the exception, and this can be accounted for by moral hazard and
Thirteenth Amendment concerns.
32. See Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 291 (1979) ("Making
specific performance more widely available at the election of the promisee would not result
in more costly pre- or post-breach negotiations than the damage remedy does at present.").
Schwartz has also argued that "[fqurther expanding of the availability of specific
performance would produce certain efficiency gains: it would minimize the inefficiencies of
undercompensaion, reduce the need for liquidated damage clauses, minimize strategic
behavior, and save the costs of litigating complex damage issues." Id.
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damages-does not generate the same allocatively efficient outcomes as
Holmes's call option for promisors (with expectation damages). Allowing the
promisee to choose between performance and expectation damages does not
achieve an efficient tradeoff: if the promisee elects performance, then she gets
the full benefit of that performance (v); if the promisee does not elect
performance, then she gets an amount equivalent to the benefit that she would
have appreciated from performance (v). This tradeoff between v from
performance and v from money damages does not situate the promisee to
allocate the entitlement efficiently because the cost of performance (c) is never
taken into account.33 What is attractive about the Holmesian option and the
efficient breach hypothesis is that the party making the decision about the
allocative outcome (i.e., the promisor) is situated to weigh the costs and the
benefits of that decision. If the promisor performs, she must pay the cost of
performance (c); if the promisor does not perform, she must pay the other
party an amount equivalent to the benefit that party would have appreciated
from performance (v). That is the tradeoff (i.e., v > c or v < c) on which the
efficient breach hypothesis relies and functions.
But specific performance at the election of the promisee may still have the
same efficiency implications attributed to the promisor's option in the efficient
breach literature. As a general matter, there is nothing unique or special about
promisors' knowledge that requires the option to be placed with them. In
theory, one could just as easily construct an efficiency-inducing option for
promisees by giving them the option to compel performance or to be paid
damages. The promisee's option described above may lead to inefficiency-not
because it is the promisee who makes the choice, but because the promisee is
not optimally situated when making that choice. Appropriately determined
damage awards, however, can encourage promisees to compel performance
when and only when it is efficient.
To achieve this efficiency, the appropriate damage award turns out to be
the familiar remedy of disgorgement. By giving the promisee the option of
compelling performance and getting v or being paid the breacher's
(opportunity) cost of performance (c), the promisee is situated to make the
33. Beyond inefficient allocation, Schwartz has observed that one might object to the promisee's
option on other efficiency grounds (i.e., costly supervision), see id. at 292-96, or on moral
grounds (i.e., concerns about promisors' liberty), see id. at 296-98. Of course, efficiency
(e.g., investment) and morality charges are also issued against the efficient breach
hypothesis. The promisee's option argument does, however, serve an important
compensation function, and providing adequate compensation was the basis of Schwartz's
argument: "Because the normative goal of contract remedies is compensation, specific
performance should lie unless it can be shown that the costs of specific performance would
exceed the gains." Id. at 294.
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optimal tradeoff (i.e., v > c or v < c).34 Table 1, again, illustrates. When
deciding whether to compel the promisor's performance, the promisee (B in
this case) compares her individual payoff from performance (which she values
at $15,ooo) to her individual payoff from nonperformance coupled with
damages. And by equating damages with the promisor's cost of performance,
the court situates the promisee to make the efficient tradeoff. Under this
regime (Rule 6 with disgorgement remedy), the promisee will compel
performance when and only when it is allocatively efficient: the efficient
performance hypothesis.
C. Remedial Choices and Consequences
The efficient performance hypothesis is not in its economic consequences
superior or inferior to the traditional efficient breach hypothesis. They are, in a
sense, complements. In one case, the court must determine the breacher's cost;
in the other, it must determine the nonbreacher's value. Depending on its
knowledge, the court may be in a better position to determine one or the other.
In one case the nonbreacher gets the surplus from nonperformance of the
original contract, while in the other case the breacher captures the surplus.
Given this distributional difference, preference shown to the breacher or to the
nonbreacher may serve additional efficiency or fairness considerations." But
economic considerations cannot tell us a priori which is the better approach.
The efficient performance hypothesis may at first appear to sit uneasily
with conventional views of the disgorgement remedy, which has received
considerable recent attention in the United States and other common law
jurisdictions. 6 Critics of this remedy have advanced both economic and ethical
34- In other words, the promisee is given the option to elect either specific performance or
disgorgement as the remedy.
35. Investment efficiency may, for instance, be served by assuring one party more of the
surplus.
36. Much has been written about a possible expansion of disgorgement as a standard remedy
for breach of contract, as signaled in a string of recent cases in the United States, Canada,
England, and Israel. E.g., EarthInfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., 900 P.2d
113 (Colo. 1995); Bank of Am. Can. v. Mut. Trust Co., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 6Ol (Can.); CA
2o/82 Adras Bldg. Material Ltd. v. Harlow & Jones Gmbh [1988] IsrSC 42(1) 221, translated
in 3 RESTITUTION L. REV. 235 (1995); Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); see, e.g., Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The
Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339 (1985); Daniel
Friedmann, Restitution of Profits Gained by Pary in Breach of Contract, 104 LAw Q. REV. 383
(1988); Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the "Restitution Interest," and the Restatement of
Contracts, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2021 (2001); Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as
Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 74 (2003).
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challenges; I address the former here and the latter in Part III of this Essay.
Two principal economic efficiency arguments have been made against
disgorgement. The first, which seems to me entirely implausible, suggests that
the evidentiary burden of establishing the disgorgement remedy is greater than
that associated with expectation damages. The belief that economic values of
promisees are more easily determined than those of promisors is simply
unfounded.37  One can easily imagine cases in which the value of
nonperformance to the promisor (e.g., a seller), or her cost of performance, is
more readily established than the value of performance to the promisee (e.g., a
buyer). Indeed, a seller's cost of procuring an item will in many cases be easier
to establish than the value a buyer places on the item.
The second efficiency argument against disgorgement is equally
unpersuasive: "Whereas the traditional rule provides the promisor with an
incentive to redirect resources efficiently, a broad restitutionary rule [like
disgorgement] tends to diminish this incentive .... Because disgorgement
does not reward the promisor for her efforts in finding valuable opportunities,
the argument goes, opportunities that are exploitable under the traditional rule
would not be realized under the alternative approach. But note that this
argument presupposes that the promisor is better situated than the promisee to
redirect resources efficiently, a supposition that may or may not be true. While
promisors can often better identify alternative uses and users than promisees,
there are numerous situations in which the promisees -who are, for example,
wholesale or retail buyers-have better access to markets of uses and users.
This empirical squabble need not distract us too much, however, because a
simple modification of the damage amount under the efficient performance
hypothesis will preserve the parties' incentives to redirect resources efficiently.
Let's grant that the promisor is the more efficient identifier of valuable
opportunities. To leave her indifferent between identifying and not identifying
37. Hanoch Dagan, for instance, notes that "[i]n order to recover the promisor's profits [i.e.,
disgorgement], the promisee is required to submit evidence regarding another's affairs."
HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 275 (2004). What is relevant,
however, is not that which is observed, but that which can be verified. A promisee may
know with certainty her own value, but she will nonetheless face high evidentiary costs if
she cannot sufficiently establish this value in court; similarly, she may have only an
approximate knowledge of the promisor's profits (or opportunity costs of performance) but
may be able to verify important aspects of them at low cost. Dagan further observes that
disgorgement "requires that difficult judgments be made regarding causation as well as
attribution of specific profits (and, presumably, also costs) to one specific transaction out of
all the undertakings of the promisor." Id. It is difficult to see why these issues of causation
and attribution would be a priori more pronounced when determining the value of one
party or another.
38. Id. at 273. Note that Dagan does not give this argument much credence.
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these opportunities, the disgorgement payment may simply be reduced to
allow the promisor to recover her identification (or search) costs.39 This
recovery, of course, must be limited to reasonable costs. Reimbursement of
search costs should not exceed the social surplus from searching; in other
words, the promisor's recovery must be capped by the difference between the
value of the performance to the promisee and the value of the efficient
alternative use. Interestingly enough, there is common law support for this
modified form of disgorgement, 4° but the key point for present purposes is
that the modified measure ensures that the right incentives exist for the
promisor under the efficient performance hypothesis, without compromising
the efficiency of the promisee's allocative decision.
Similarly, when promisees are better identifiers, comparable modifications
may be undertaken to produce optimal incentives under the efficient breach
hypothesis. 4 Together these hypotheses suggest some flexibility for courts in
pursuit of various consequentialist goals, and one approach cannot be said to
trump the other in this regard. They are comparably efficient. The same,
however, cannot be said about the moral implications of the approaches. While
the efficient breach hypothesis runs counter to broadly held moral intuitions
about promises and contracts, the efficient performance hypothesis satisfies
these intuitions, or at least does not contradict them. I shall establish this
proposition in the remainder of this Essay.
39. Note that indifference is sufficient: compensating the promisor with more than her search
costs when she identifies the exploited alternative opportunity is unnecessary for efficiency
(alternatively, the promisor may be offered her identification costs plus some very small
amount, E> o, where e-4 o).
40. Recall the well-known English case Boardman v. Phipps, [1967] 2 A.C. 46 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.), in which a trustee generated significant profits for a trust, but also for
himself in contravention of the trust agreement. While the court ordered the fiduciary to
disgorge all profits, it nonetheless allowed him to retain a portion that would serve as
compensation for his efforts in identifying the valuable opportunities. The law here is
somewhat mixed, allowing recovery in some cases and denying it in others. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 404, 407 (1958); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY S 8.02 cmt. e (2006) (reiterating this position).
41. These modifications, however, are not without costs. Using a remedy other than
disgorgement with the efficient performance rule (or expectation damages with the efficient
breach rule) places an additional burden on the court of determining the transfer amount to
the non-choosing party.
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III. ETHICS AND ECONOMICS
Almost everyonc who has anything to say about the subject agrees that, as a
general matter, people have a moral obligation to keep their promises.42
Moving from promise to contract, commentators are conflicted about
whether-and under what circumstances -breaching a contract constitutes
breaking a promise, rendering the breach immoral. This conflict is played out
most prominently in debates about efficient breach. But the vast majority of
the normative arguments for and against efficient breach seem to be based on a
positive claim regarding what constitutes a contractual promise.
Unfortunately, the commentary on both sides of the debate is marred by a lack
of explicit attention to this claim. The result is that commentators, when
making normative arguments about efficient breach, tend to talk past one
another.
A. Positive Confusion
Supporters of efficient breach typically argue-often with little
justification-that by contracting, the promisor intends either to perform
(those deeds set forth or implied in the contract) or to pay damages for
nonperformance. Under this view, nonperformance of the stipulated deeds,
followed by payment of damages to the promisee, does not amount to
promise-breaking in a practical sense-nor in an ethical sense, because the
promise is to "perform deeds or pay damages. ,43 Opponents of efficient breach
42. Various moral theories provide different accounts of why we have a moral obligation to keep
our promises. See HUME, supra note 2; IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
6:304-:305 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (1797); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(rev. ed. 1999); David Owens, A Simple Theory of Promising, 115 PHIL. REV. 51 (20o6); T.M.
Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 86.
43. One might think of the contractual promise in terms of a fill-in-the-price mechanism that
includes a price and quantity-quality schedule for all possible states. See, e.g., Benjamin K.
Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, Judicial Modification of Contracts Between Sophisticated Parties: A
More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 230 (1993);
Akira Konakayama et al., Efficient Contracting with Reliance and a Damage Measure, 17 RAND
J. ECON. 450 (1986). Imagine a simple contract between a buyer and a seller for the delivery
of some specified units of a good for a specified price. The "sophisticated" parties described
by these authors do not settle for these simple contracts; they also specify prices associated
with other delivered quantities, including zero units ("nonperformance") and more units
than expected. In this way, the parties really cannot breach contracts, and all that is left for
the court to do is to specifically enforce the mechanism if any party does not do her part.
The problem with this approach, however, is that contracts are necessarily incomplete, even
when written by sophisticated parties. But while contracts are ex ante incomplete, after the
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tend to disagree with this description of what is promised in a contract. They
argue that by contracting, the promisor agrees to perform (those deeds set
forth or implied in the contract). Although they allow for the possibility that
the promisor may not perform-i.e., that performance may be validly excused,
or that legal and moral sanctions may follow nonperformance -they contend
that the promise itself does not have payment as a built-in contingency for
nonperformance. Thus, one way to view the debate is to observe that both
supporters and opponents of efficient breach seem to agree that promise-
breaking is morally wrong. They just disagree about the nature of the promises
made in contracts. 44
Regrettably, scholars have made relatively little effort to identify
empirically the social meaning of contractual promises. 41 Instead they often
rely on uncritical appeals to personal sensibilities and "normative" judgments.
Courts, however, have by necessity wrestled for centuries with the empirical
question of what parties mean by their contractual promises. Over the years,
there have been exactly two sets of occasions in which courts are asked to
determine whether the parties intended their contractual promise to mean
merely "perform" or "perform or pay." The first is when the contract stipulates
deeds without mentioning payment in the case of nonperformance of those
deeds. The second is when the contract stipulates deeds and explicitly calls for
payment when the stipulated deeds are not performed. That is, courts have
fact, courts can often observe (or speculate about) what the parties would have wanted had
the ex ante transaction costs of contract specification not been prohibitive. Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel use such a framework to explain a number of aspects of
fiduciary, contract, and corporate law. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993). Under this conception, the efficient
breach hypothesis isn't about breach at all; it is a gap-filling proposition that uses the
hypothetical bargain to identify the payments that parties would have wanted (i.e.,
intended) to be associated with performance that does not conform to the extant agreement.
This approach, of course, doesn't deal with issues of noncontractibility (aspects of
agreements that are impossible to verify ex post, making the hypothetical bargain
inapplicable), but it is a useful approach in many cases.
44. Some opponents of efficient breach also argue that expectation damages tend to be
undercompensatory. This argument (in addition to supporting efficiency claims against
efficient breach) presents a moral claim that under an expectation damages regime,
breaching is morally wrong because it allows the promisor to benefit at the expense of the
promisee. See, e.g., Friedmann, supra note 6; Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract:
Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982).
45. Noteworthy empirical research on the social meaning of contractual promises may
nonetheless be found, even if it is rare. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992);
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc.
REV. 55 (1963)-
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long recognized that although the parties may stipulate a damage amount in
the event of nonperformance, such a stipulation does not necessarily imply an
intention to give the promisor an unfettered option to perform or pay. Indeed,
the stipulation might imply just the opposite. By setting a stipulated damage
amount so high that it has the practical effect of discouraging nonperformance,
parties may convey their intent that nonperformance, while always a real
option for the promisor, should not be construed as a permissive one. Penal
bonds, which were regularly enforced from the medieval era through the late
seventeenth century, were often used for this purpose. 6
Even when a court was convinced that a bond was not being used to
terrorize the promisor to perform, it did not automatically assume that the
bond implied an intent to create an optional contract-one that explicitly
permitted the promisor to fulfill her obligation by performance or by payment.
Parties often stipulated payment for nonperformance through a separate bond
(or within the contract) merely as a means of assuring that they received no
less than actual damages in the event of breach.47 Of course, parties did at times
46. Parties exchanged bonds with large monetary payoffs that would become defeasible on
performance of a party's promise, see THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE
OF DAMAGES; OR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES WHICH GOVERN THE AMOUNT OF
COMPENSATION RECOVERED IN SUITS AT LAW 392 (N.Y., John S. Voorhies 2d ed. 1852), or
void following an express condition subsequent (i.e., performance), see Robert E. Scott &
George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1440 (2004).
47. Whether parties employing penal bonds as such actually intended this outcome or whether
it was a fiction of the courts remains unclear. In any event, it allowed the court to pursue
what it believed to be the parties' intent, while rejecting excessive penalties. When a
promisor failed to perform, the promisee would be entitled to actual damages paid out of
the bond, and any remaining balance on the bond would be returned to the promisor. For
example, in Sloman v. Walter, (1783) 28 Eng. Rep. 1213, 1214 (Ch.), the Chancellor confirmed
that when a penal bond was used to secure the enjoyment of a separate objective, the
separate objective was "considered as the principal intent of the deed." The bond's purpose
was to "secure the damage really incurred," and therefore the defendant did not need to pay
the penalty, but only actual damages. Id. What happened when actual damages were greater
than the amount of the bond? Courts were divided on this question: some treated the bond
as setting the maximum recovery, see, e.g., Wilbeam v. Ashton, (1807) 17o Eng. Rep. 883
(K.B.); Stewart v. Rumball, (1705) 23 Eng. Rep. 926 (Ch.); Hale v. Thomas, (1685) 23 Eng.
Rep. 515 (Ch.), while others provided for full recovery of actual damages even if it exceeded
the bond amount, see, e.g., Chilliner v. Chilliner, (1754) 28 Eng. Rep. 337 (Ch.); Hobson v.
Trevor, (1723) 24 Eng. Rep. 695 (Ch.). Courts recognized that parties also sought to ensure
that actual damages were not underestimated by enumerating payments in the event of
nonperformance (essentially, what we now refer to as a liquidated damages clause).
Although courts often viewed these clauses skeptically, fearing that they might be penalties
in disguise, courts did not discourage their use, but rather relied on them more or less
depending on whether actual damages were difficult or easy to determine. See SEDGWICK,
supra note 46, at 400.
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incorporate stipulated amounts in agreements to convey their intention to
allow promisors to discharge their duties through payments. These so-called
alternative or optional contracts explicitly provided that the promisor could
fulfill her obligation by either performing specified deeds or paying specified
amounts (at the promisor's election) .48 Yet the intentions behind these
agreements were not self-disclosing, and courts struggled mightily over
them.49 If it is hard to figure out whether parties intend their contractual
promises to be of the form "perform or pay" when their agreements expressly
state amounts that should be paid in the event of nonperformance, then what
can we conclude about the parties' intentions and the meanings of their
promises when their agreements are silent on nonperformance contingencies?
This is the key empirical question. And to the extent that contract
obligation derives from the intention (subjective or objective) of parties, an
empirical answer is the only means of resolving the positive debate over the
meaning of contractual promises."0 We need not essentialize promises (as
opposed to other means of giving rise to contractual obligation), but it would
be surprising if, for most people, contractual promises do not share some of the
moral imperative behind promises generally. This is not to say that the two
relations are identical or that one is a subset of the other. The legal relation is
not defined by the social one, but they are connected in the minds of most
people, except perhaps for the Holmesian bad man (whose morals may be
represented as the lowest common denominator for civic participation). All the
same, while Holmes predicted a legal-moral disconnect for the bad man,
leading to a "perform or pay" conception of contract duty, he himself rejected
48. See, e.g., Pearson v. Williams' Adm'rs, 24 Wend. -44 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840), affid, 26 Wend.
630 (N.Y. 1841); Lowe v. Peers, (1768) 98 Eng. Rep. 16o (K.B.).
49- See SEDGWICK, supra note 46, at 398 (quoting Lord Kaims's lament that courts frequently
and incorrectly labeled alternative obligations as penalties).
50. There has been considerable research by economists on the optimal structure of stipulated
damages. See, e.g., Aaron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Contracts, 78 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 33 (2003); Goetz & Scott, supra note 27; Hermalin & Katz, supra note 43;
Kathryn E. Spier & Michael D. Whinston, On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for
Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 18o (1995).
Recently, law and economics scholars have turned their gaze to the circumstances in which
parties would explicitly contract for damages, the option to compel performance, or both.
See, e.g., Ronen Avraham & Zhiyong Liu, Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information:
Exclusive Versus Optional Remedies, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REv. (forthcoming 20o6); Steven
Shavell, Specific Performance Versus Damages for Breach of Contract: An Economic Analysis, 84
TEX. L. REv. 831 (2006); Richard R.W. Brooks, Simple Rules for Simple Courts (Mar. 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). In contrast to the present Essay, this line of
research focuses on the optimal design and implementation of remedial options, rather than
on what may be inferred about the nature of contractual rights given these options.
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this morally permissive understanding.' In the end, perhaps the only
difference between Holmes and the critics of his option theory of contract was
that he predicted that the social meaning of contract promises would prove to
be close to the views held by the bad man, while his challengers predicted that
it would be closer to Holmes's personal views. These predictions still await
(dis)confirmnation.
B. Normative Clarity
"Breach of a legal contract without excuse is wrong conduct." 2 No one can
doubt this. When contractual parties explicitly promise to "perform deeds" as
opposed to "perform deeds or pay money," the fact that they knowingly face
the legal consequence of "pay money" for breach in the former case does not
create an equivalence between it and the latter case. 3 Posner is correct to
observe that on some level (say, economic) the promises generate the same
"practical effect, '' 54 but they do not have the same legal and moral effect. To
miss this point is to obscure the difference between a price and a fine-a
sanction. Prices and sanctions are not the same: prices permit "acts that leave
the individual discretion to make choices. In contrast, law sanctions forbidden
51. "I don't think a man promises to pay damages in contract any more than in tort. He
commits an act that makes him liable for them if a certain event does not come to pass, just
as his act in tort makes him liable simpliciter." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to
Frederick Pollock (Dec. 11, 1928), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 233, 233 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed., 1941).
S2. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 247 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
53. Legal rules often simultaneously provide guidance to individuals subject to the rules and to
officials charged with enforcing these rules. For instance, a rule of contract enforcement may
direct promisors to perform their promises, while at the same time directing judges to
compel payment of compensation when promises are not performed. Meir Dan-Cohen
refers to the latter, the directive addressed to judges and other officials, as a "decision rule"
and to the former, the directive addressed to promisors, as a "conduct rule." Meir Dan-
Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV.
L. REv. 625, 627 (1984). In the world of full acoustic separation imagined by Dan-Cohen,
where judges and promisors heard only their own directives, promisors would understand
their duty to keep their promises as something distinct from an option to either perform or
face judicial sanctions. But, alas, we do not live in a world where "law's attempt to segregate
its normative messages through acoustic separation," id. at 636, can be fully realized. From
this perspective, it is easy to see how scholars such as Jeremy Bentham, Hans Kelsen, and
Richard Posner might distort a legal duty to perform contractual promises into a duty to
"perform or pay."
54. See POSNER, supra note 9, at 58.
591
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
acts that involve social judgments.""5 That this difference may be lost on the
bad man (or, to use the contemporary euphemism, the "sophisticated party")
does not in itself delimit the legal and social meanings of contract promises. It
is here that efficient breach arguments become problematic by suggesting a
legal theory of contract - as opposed to a purely economic one - while refusing
to acknowledge that sanctions have legal and social meaning beyond their
nominal translation into prices. 6 But economic efficiency doesn't compel this
limited view of legal obligation. The efficient performance hypothesis
implicitly establishes this point, which I shall now make explicit.
To demonstrate the point, recall the triple {e, d, m}, in which e represents
an entitlement holder, d denotes who has the legal right to allocate the
entitlement, and m is the measure of damages paid to the entitlement holder
when the entitlement is allocated away from her. It is tempting to see the
efficient performance hypothesis's use of disgorgement (m) as a source of
moral superiority to efficient breach. After all, disgorgement deprives
promisors of the "unjust" gains of their wrongful conduct, a deprivation that
may also have the beneficial secondary effect of discouraging the conduct in the
first place. This view, however, is not sustainable. First, wrongful
nonperformance by the promisor does not imply that the subsequent gains
from such conduct are unjust. A promisor's efforts to create more efficient
opportunities may justify her participation in some or all of the gains of these
opportunities, despite the wrongful action taken to bring them to fruition."7
Furthermore, even if it would be unjust for the gains to go to the promisor, it is
not clear that it would be any more just for them to go to the promisee . 8 One
might, of course, view the normative justification of disgorgement not in terms
55. Robert Cooter, Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-Control and Self-Improvement for
the "Bad Man" of Holmes, 78 B.U.L. REv. 903, 915 (1998); see also Robert Cooter, Prices and
Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984); Dan-Cohen, supra note 53, at 627 (observing "the
difference between a fine and a tax").
56. One might argue that it is not necessarily improper for economics to fail to draw a
distinction between prices and sanctions (and note that Holmes's bad man embodies the
ethics of the neoclassical self-interested rational economic actor), but for American contract
law the difference is nontrivial. Yet, there is also a growing empirical literature among
economists showing that economic actors do distinguish between prices and sanctions. See
Samuel Bowles, Mandeville's Mistake: Are Good Laws a Substitute for Good Citizens? (Oct.
19, 2oo6) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
57. See Boardman v. Phipps, [1967] 2 A.C. 46 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); see also
discussion supra note 40.
58. "The taint that attaches to the promisor's gain by the wrongful manner of its acquisition
does not in itself make the promisee rather than someone else the justified recipient of that
gain." Weinrib, supra note 36, at 74. What is missing here, as Ernest Weinrib observes, is
"the normative connection between the gain and the promisee's entitlement to it." Id.
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of deservingness, but as a means of deterring the wrongful conduct itself- a
prophylaxis-making use, to paraphrase Fuller and Perdue, of "[w]hatever
tends to discourage breach of contract." 9 But this view would also recommend
specific performance, prison, and other penalties for breach. Distinctions
among these remedies may be drawn, but this is unnecessary for present
purposes because the moral force of the efficient performance hypothesis
derives not from the damage measure it employs, but from its assignment and
treatment of rights.
When one promises in contract to perform X, the promise creates an
entitlement (e) for the promisee. But what is the nature of that entitlement:
exactly what has the promisee acquired from the promisor? I believe it
mistaken to argue that the promisee acquires a right to the subject matter of the
promise-a right to possess X. Nor is it sufficient to say that the promisee
acquires a right to be placed in the same position she would enjoy from
possessing X-i.e., to be provided with a comparable utility level U(X).
6 °
Rather, by promising in contract, the promisor relinquishes her legal right to
choose whether to perform the promised deed. Moreover, according to some
moral philosophies, this right is in large part conveyed to the promisee.
Immanuel Kant, for instance, argued that the promisee acquires possession of
"another's choice to perform a specific deed (praestatio).,,6 ' That d is assigned to
the promisee is an essential fact of contract under this Kantian view. But it is
not just this particular view of contract that assigns d to the promisee.
Contemporary philosophers, such as David Owens, also embrace the view that
the promisee acquires the right to compel or release the promisor's
performance. 62 The promisor retains the power over the choice to perform the
promised deed, but not the right. 6' The efficient breach hypothesis is
inattentive to this key distinction, while the efficient performance hypothesis is
premised on it.
59. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 19, at 61 (observing another remedy's "purpose being not so
much to compensate the promisee as to penalize breach of promise by the promisor").
6o. U denotes the utility function of the promisee and U(X) her level of enjoyment from X.
61. KANT, supra note 42, at 6:247.
62. See Owens, supra note 42. As Jules Coleman suggests, the promisee acquiring this discretion
is fundamental to the classical liberal conception of rights. JULES COLEMAN, RiSKS AND
WRONGS 336 (1992) ("How can a liability rule ... protect my right when it gives you and
others certain important discretions with respect to the uses to which ny right can be put
63. The promisor retains actual power, or what Wesley Hohfeld called physical power, as
opposed to what he defined as legal power, the power to effect a change in legal relations.
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 4.4, 52 (1913).
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All morally informed views of contract obligation understand the promisor
as constrained by the promise (hence the obligation). Conceptions of contract
with ethical views stronger than the efficient breach's "intermediate level of
moral force" typically require that the legal right to choose whether to perform
(d) is not assigned to the promisor. Yet this does not imply that d must
therefore be assigned to the promisee, as the efficient performance hypothesis
dictates. The claim here is not, however, that the efficient performance
hypothesis is consistent with all, or even most, moral understandings of
contract promises, just with some. Still, the logic behind the efficient
performance hypothesis does suggest that one might devise even more
nuanced approaches to the assignment of d-involving, for instance, state-
contingent or fractionated assignments6 4- that could suit other moral
formulations of contract promises while achieving efficiency. I will say a little
more about this in the Conclusion.
Let us now turn to the third and final aspect of the claim that efficiency
allows for competing notions of contractual obligation. Having argued that
both e and d rest with the promisee under some, perhaps most, moral
frameworks of contract enforcement, I must now show that the damage
measure (m) employed by the alternative hypothesis is consistent with such
frameworks. Let's continue to focus on the Kantian conception of contract
entitlement as described above. Kant doesn't tell us which damage measure
should be used for breach of contract, but according to Ernest Weinrib, the
"Kantian account of contractual entitlement provides a basis for the expectation
measure of damages.' 65 1 remain unconvinced that there are particularly strong
grounds for this conclusion 66 but take the claim as given. Under the modified
disgorgement remedy described earlier, any transfer from the promisee's
disgorgement remedy to the promisor that leaves the promisee with at least her
expectation (plus e > o, as e --- o) will preserve the efficiency of her allocative
decision. This means that the alternative hypothesis can be implemented with
essentially the expectation remedy (if one believes that this remedy is required
under the Kantian framework) without changing its basic conclusion. Indeed,
64. The promisor's obligations may also be validly excused by the realization of certain
conditions (i.e., d may be assigned to the promisor in some circumstances), or the
promisor's right to demand performance or compensation may be triggered by the
occurrence of certain events (so that d is assigned to the promisee in some circumstances), or
a third party, such as the court, may possess the legal right to choose.
65. Weinrib, supra note 36, at 68.
66. It seems that this basis is really more of a convenience, "merely a way of measuring the value
of the promise itself." Id.
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any damage amount between expectation and disgorgement will suffice,
regardless of which is greater.6 7
CONCLUSION
There are a number of reasons why promises give rise to legal and moral
obligations. Reliance on promises by others is a familiar justification in law and in
philosophy for the obligation to keep one's promises. 68 Social practices also clearly
provide moral force to promises; promise-keeping, observed David Hurne, is an
"artificial virtue" -artificial, in contrast to natural, but nonetheless a real moral
virtue.i Yet breaking promises (in contracts or otherwise) need not be immoral.
That determination depends upon expectations and established conventions
involving promises.
.For some time now, there has been a sustained effort in American contract law
to dissociate general moral obligations to keep promises from the conventions of
contract obligation and the practices of legal enforcement. Beginning with
Holmes and others in the late 18oos and intensifying in the law and economics
scholarship of the past quarter-century, some jurists and scholars have argued for
an approach to contract enforcement that would render breach legally and morally
uncontestable, assuming compensation follows. Much of the justification for this
conceptual endeavor has rested upon claims of judicial and economic efficiency.70
But efficiency neither favors nor disfavors their conception of contract, formalized
67. As suggested earlier, transfers from the promisor to the promisee may also be made under
the efficient breach hypothesis to, in effect, replicate the disgorgement remedy without
sacrificing the allocative efficiency of the traditional approach. The nominal damage
remedies operate here merely as prices, guiding behavior toward efficiency without any
particular ethical import. Yet lump-sum transfers may be used, as suggested by the Second
Theorem of Welfare Economics, to pursue ethical aims of compensation and distribution
while achieving an efficient allocation of resources. This simply reinforces the claim that it is
not a difference in remedies that distinguishes efficient breach from efficient performance.
The key difference is the fundamental understanding of legal rights- what Coleman calls
the semantic content of rights. COLEMAN, supra note 62, at 335-40.
68. Scanlon, for instance, explains the moral obligation to keep promises "in terms of general
principles arising from the interests that others have in being able to rely on expectations
about what we are going to do." T.M. Scanlon, Thickness and Theory, loo J. PHIL. 275, 283
(2003).
69 . HUME, supra note 2, at 518-19 ("[P]romises have no force, antecedent to human
conventions.").
70. Limited empirical work on the matter suggests that this conceptualization has had
practically no impact on judicial practice. See Craig S. Warkol, Note, Resolving the Paradox
Between Legal Theory and Legal Fact: The Judicial Rejection of the Theory of Efficient Breach, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 321 (1998).
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by the efficient breach hypothesis. I have claimed in this Essay that amorality or,
more accurately, the particular form of morality employed by the efficient breach
hypothesis, is not required for efficiency. To demonstrate this claim, the Essay
developed an alternative approach to contract enforcement- expressed as the
efficient performance hypothesis -based on a stronger notion of promissory
obligation than that associated with efficient breach; it showed the alternative and
traditional hypotheses to be equally efficient.
The efficiency equivalence between these hypotheses may have been predicted
from the First Theorem of Welfare Economics." This theorem can be
summarized in two parts: first, with appropriate prices, a competitive market will
lead to efficient allocation of resources; second, a competitive market process will
generate appropriate prices.72 Similarly, both the efficient breach and efficient
performance hypotheses will lead to efficient allocation of resources when
damages for breach are appropriately chosen. But, of course, it is an evidentiary
process - not a competitive one- that brings about the appropriate "prices" in this
context. Thus, one might prefer efficient breach or efficient performance if there is
reason to believe that the evidentiary process (or judicial efficacy) supports one
hypothesis over the other. I have suggested that, a priori, there is no good reason
for such a belief
Yet if, a priori, these hypotheses are indistinguishable in terms of efficiency,
they are certainly not equivalent in terms of their conception of promissory
obligation. And, importantly, it is not the "price" of breach (i.e., nominal
disgorgement or expectation damages) that matters ethically; it is the nature of
the rights that attach to promissory obligation. The efficient breach hypothesis
supposes that the promisor has the legal right- not merely the de facto power- to
choose to perform or pay damages. That right belongs to the promisee under the
efficient performance hypothesis. Moreover the discrete ethical conceptions
represented in the efficient breach and efficient performance hypotheses do not
exhaust the possibilities. These hypotheses taken together, in fact, suggest that
other conceptions of moral obligation may be infused in efficient enforcement
mechanisms if sufficient attention is paid to "prices." Of course, not every ethical
conception of promissory obligation can be made to fit within an efficiency
framework, but the possibilities are significantly greater than the efficient breach
hypothesis would suggest.
71. The economic outcomes, of course, will not necessarily be equivalent given different
endowments of rights and resources.
72. Economists broadly regard proof of this theorem as a formal demonstration of Adam
Smith's claim that economic exchange will lead self-interested individuals, like an "invisible
hand," to promote the public benefit.
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